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CASE NOTES
concerned with the problem of dual aspect uses of public property leased
to private individuals. It would appear from the facts and decisions of
these cases, that, if faced with the tax problem created by the "oases,"
California and Indiana would not favor an exemption, while Massachusetts
would allow the exemption to stand. As noted earlier, Ohio would prob-
ably continue strictly to construe the "exclusive" requirement of its consti-
tution40 and disallow an exemption. New Jersey, on the other hand, under
almost identical circumstances, approved of the exemption. The only other
jurisdiction to have considered the problem of dual aspect uses was New
York, which, through a liberal application of the primary use doctrine,
has approved of such an exemption. 41 Without any decisions to indicate
otherwise, it must be presumed that remaining jurisdictions continue to
construe constitutional and statutory grants of exemption against the party
to be taxed and the exemption. Illinois, in following the view of the
Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey courts, represents the new
trend. The real purpose behind this new trend is not merely the recog-
nition of supremacy of the primary use doctrine based on the benefit
bestowed upon the public but, more importantly, a recognition of the
expanding use of publicly-owned property in a proprietary manner to
serve public ends. In discussing a New York case which had supported
an exemption in a dual aspect situation, one commentator stated that:
[T]he tone of the case indicates the court is attempting to ease the restric-
tions on incidental use of state property for a private purpose.42
As more jurisdictions are confronted with this still novel problem of dual
aspect leases, they will begin to adopt the view of the Illinois court. It is
inevitable that, as the scope and functions of city and state government
expand to meet the increasingly complex problems of industrialization and
urbanization, the courts will be confronted with many more cases involv-
ing the dual aspect use of public property.
Bruce Rasbkow
4oSupra note 31.
41 State Insurance Fund v. Hamblin, 31 Misc. 2d 977, 222 N.Y.2d 732 (1961).
42 Note, 13 SYRACUSE L. REV. 617 (1962).
SALES-IMPLIED WARRANTY-BLOOD RECEIVED
FROM A BLOOD BANK
Plaintiff's wife entered St. Mary's Hospital for treatment of an ailment.
While being treated, she required several blood transfusions which were
administered by the hospital using whole blood supplied by the defendant
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blood bank. After several weeks, the patient developed infectious serum
hepatitis caused by the defendant's supply of jaundiced blood. The patient
became severely ill, and subsequently, her husband sued the defendant for
his wife's injuries under derivative rights. Recovery was denied. Balko-
witsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805
(Minn. 1965).
The plaintiff's argument for recovery was predicated upon two con-
tentions. First, a sale had taken place between the parties, since the plaintiff
had received blood and the defendant direct payment for the blood.
Secondly, an implied warranty of merchantability had accompanied the
sale, warranting that the substance sold was of merchantable quality.'
Plaintiff contended that since the blood sold to him caused serious injury
to his wife, it was not of merchantable quality, and he sought recovery on
these grounds. The court denied plaintiff recovery on the theory holding
that a transfer of blood was more a service than a sale.2 This rejection by
the court of the sales warranty theory of recovery necessitates an analysis
and discussion of the implications of this theory as applied to a factual
situation such as appears in the Balkowitscb case.
In discarding the sales warranty theory in the Balkowitsch case, the
court reviewed several serum hepatitis cases which had previously rejected
the theory.3 Since hospitals were defendants in all of these cases, in order
to hold as they did in the instant case, the court concluded that hospitals
and blood banks performed similar acts. 4 However, if the court had
concluded that blood banks and hospitals differed in function, all of the
preceding serum hepatitis case holdings which had rejected the warranty
theory of recovery would have been inapplicable to the Balkowitscb fac-
tual situation. One rationale for distinguishing a blood bank from a hos-
pital is that a hospital can perform the functions of a blood bank but,
conversely, a blood bank cannot function as a hospital.5 Since blood banks
cannot provide the overall curative services of a hospital, the court could
not have adopted the reasoning of the hospital cases to reject the sales
warranty theory as it did in this case. The reasoning was peculiar to hos-
pitals and could not be expanded to include blood banks. The court,
therefore, would have been forced to seek different authority in arriving
at a conclusion.
1Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn.
1965).
2d. at 810. 3 1d. at 809. 4ld. at 810.
5 By defining a blood bank as "a place for storage of or an institution storing blood
or plasma," WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 237 (1961 ed.), the court
could have held that a blood bank could not function as a hospital, because, as a logical
analysis of this definition illustrates, a hospital when storing blood can function as
a blood bank, but, conversely, a blood bank in no way can assume all of the services
of a hospital.
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A careful examination of the "hospital" serum hepatitis cases illustrates
their inapplicability in reasoning to the Balkowitsch factual situation. The
landmark Perlmutter hospital case,6 which was representative of those
hospital cases relied upon by the court in the Balkowitsch decision,7 was
described as the leading of several "serum hepatitis blood-bank cases""
in which plaintiff had adopted the theory that a blood transfusion consti-
tuted a sale. In this case, the patient-plaintiff brought a cause of action
against the hospital-defendant for providing jaundiced blood from which
plaintiff contracted serum hepatitis.9 The court held that a hospital could
not be sued on a sales warranty theory because no sale had taken place,
reasoning that the patient had bargained for the general overall services
of the hospital to administer a cure and not merely for the transfer of
blood from the hospital to the patient.'O Such a transfer was in effect a
part of the overall contract which the court further stipulated was in-
divisible.1 '
The Balkowitsch factual situation differs significantly from the facts in
the Perlmutter case. In the Balkowitsch case, the patient-plaintiff did not
bring a cause of action against a hospital-defendant for a defect in overall
hospital services, but based its action against the blood-bank-defendant
merely for the transfer (sale) of the jaundice producing blood.12 The
simple objective of this contract was that the defendant supply pure, in-
fection-free, blood to the patient for direct monetary consideration. Un-
like the Perlmutter and similar cases, overall services to effect a cure for
the patient in no way became a part of the objective of the contract be-
tween the patient and the blood bank.
Therefore, if the Balko'witscb court had concluded that hospitals and
blood banks functioned differently, it would have been forced to conclude
that a blood bank does not offer overall curative services and that such
services are not bargained for; the sole objective of the transaction is a
transfer of blood from the blood bank to patient, which results in a sale.
Hence, the court would have had to discard the hospital line of cases as
precedent for rejecting the sales warranty theory, because the Perlmutter
"overall" service theory was inapplicable. If the court had so held, other
authority could have been sought in support of a conclusion.
6 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
7Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, supra note 1 at 809-10.
8 Hidy v. State, 207 Misc. 207, 151 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1955), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 756, 143 N.E.
2d 528, 163 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1957); Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis.
2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964); Dibble v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital,
12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1956); and Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital Dist.,
48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956).
9 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, supra note 6.
b0Id. at 102, 123 N.E.2d at 794. 11 Ibid.
12 Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., supra note 1 at 805.
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In a federal district case, the court classified "blood plasma" as a drug, 13
the processing of which is regulated under the Virus, Serum and Toxic
Act 14 of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. From this,
it could be concluded that drug cases dealing with serums (i.e., vaccines)
sold by manufacturers to patients would be most analogous to the Balko-
witscb case. Such a drug case is Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories." In
this case, a child had been inoculated with the Salk polio vaccine' 6 manu-
factured by defendant laboratories. The child later contracted polio from
the vaccine which had contained live poliomyelitis virus. As one ground
of recovery,'7 the plaintiff alleged that the supplier manufacturer had
breached the implied warranty of merchantability. The court granted
recovery on this strict liability theory, stating that in California, the rule
provided that the consumer of adulterated food products could recover
upon an implied warranty of merchantability and that there is "no reason
to differentiate the policy considerations requiring pure and wholesome
food from those requiring pure and wholesome vaccine."'" Since blood
plasma' 9 can be classified as a drug, certainly this policy argument should
be applicable to blood when transfused into the body. According to one
commentator, the argument may be stronger regarding blood plasma
because
[t]he defenses provided by the digestive system as a means of rejecting or
minimizing the effects of many toxic compounds taken orally are much less
available as against harmful elements introduced into the system by injec-
tion.20
13 Merck & Co. v. Kidd, 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
14 42 U.S.C.A. S 262 (1964).
15 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).
16Both the heterogenous and autogenous vaccines are made of microorganisms
which have been isolated from persons having a particular infectious disease. Vaccines
liken themselves to blood transfused into the body in that both emanate from one
person and are either injected or transfused into another. 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
924 (1961 ed.).
17 Another ground upon which plaintiff sought recovery was negligence; however,
the case was decided upon the implied sales warranty theory. Gottsdanker v. Cutter
Laboratories, supra note 15.
18 Id. at 607, 6 Cal. Reptr. at 323.
19 Plasma is the fluid part of the blood remaining after the red cells have been
removed. It is more advantageous to administer plasma rather than whole blood because
the typing of plasma is less necessary since plasma from one individual can generally
be given to anyone else regardless of blood groups. Both whole blood and plasma
can be jaundiced and contain the serum hepatitis virus. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRIrANiCA 749
(1961 ed.), see also Hidy v. State, supra note 8.
20 Note, 18 OKLA. L. REV. 104, 108 (1965).
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Even though courts in the blood bank cases have rejected the analogy
between the implied warranty of food and that of blood,21 the Gotts-
danker analysis, relating food to drugs, indicates that such an analogy
exists.22 As early as 1936, one court held that the dispenser of food for
consumption on the premises impliedly warranted that such was of
merchantable quality, even though the food had not been prepared by the
dispenser. 23 The court stated that "[tihe customer knows that mere due
care in the selection and preparation of food will not fully protect the
customer. Nothing will protect him effectively but wholesome food.24
This court's argument can be adopted to a situation wherein a patient
relies on the judgment and skill of the blood bank to supply wholesome
blood. Due care is not enough to protect the patient.25 Nothing will pro-
tect him effectively but wholesome blood. Therefore, this argument, when
applied to blood banks, asserts that nothing other than a strict liability
theory in either tort or contract (i.e., sales warranty) can be used to gain
recovery from a blood bank by a patient injured by jaundice blood.
Thus, the authority provided by analogous drug and food cases indi-
cates that a patient should be able to recover on an implied warranty
theory from a blood bank which sold jaundice-producing blood to the
patient for a direct monetary consideration.
According to the case law, it appears that a court should be able to
grant recovery to a plaintiff seeking damages from a blood bank on a
sales warranty theory if the court relies on food and drug case authority.
If such a factual situation as arose in the Balkowitscb case should arise in
a jurisdiction which has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, a differ-
ent decision might result from that rendered in the Balkowitsch case.
There have been no decisions in Uniform Commercial Code Jurisdictions
directly in point, but an indication of the treatment given by the Code
can be seen by examining sections of the Uniform Commercial Code text
and comments, as well as associated cases.
Section 2-102 of the Code, provides that "[u]nless the context other-
21 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, supra note 6; Dibble v. Dr. S. H. Groves
Latter-Day Saints Hospital, supra note 8.
22 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra note 15 at 607, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
23 Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (1936); see Decker and Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
24 Cushing v. Rodman, supra at at 868.
* 25 Medical science has obviated recovery in serum hepatitis cases on a theory
of negligence because there is no scientific way of discovering serum hepatitis virus
in either the blood donated or the donor. If there is to be recovery in these cases,
it will have to be on a theory of strict liability. See Alsever, The Blood Bank and
Homologous Serum jaundice, 261 NEw ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 383 (1959).
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wise requires, this article applies to transactions in goods. '26 If a supply
of blood can be considered as goods within the confines of the Code and
there are no provisions to the contrary, the Code would govern trans-
actions regarding the transfer of blood. The Code defines "goods" as "all
things... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale, other than money ... investment securities and things in action." 27
Nowhere in the Code text or comments is there a further expansion or
delineation of the definition of "all things. '28 Since blood has not been
expressly or impliedly excluded as a thing and is a movable quantity at
the time of identification to a contract of sale, it would appear that a
supply of blood can be considered as "goods" within the confines of the
Code.29
The Code provides that a contract or agreement for a sale refers to the
present or future sale of goods,30 and that "a 'sale' consists in the passing
of title from seller to the buyer for a price."'' 3 In the Balkowitsch case,
the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an agreement whereby the
defendant passed title to a movable thing identifiable to the contract at
its inception for a price paid by the plaintiff. Accordingly, this would
appear to be a sale which would be governed by the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Under the provisions of the Code, in order for an implied warranty of
merchantability to attach to the sale of goods, the seller must be a mer-
chant with respect to the goods sold.12 Section 2-104 defines a person
who deals in goods of a kind as a merchant.33 Therefore, if a quantity of
blood can be considered as goods, a seller of blood (i.e., blood bank)
should be considered as a merchant. The Code does not require that a
profit motive underly a transaction in order for a person or institution to
be considered a merchant.3 4 The only Code qualification for a merchant
is that he deal in goods of a kind. If a seller of goods also qualifies as a
merchant, an implied warranty of merchantability then attaches to goods
26 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
27 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-105 (emphasis added).
2 8 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Art. 2.
29 For further discussion of what constitutes "goods" under the Uniform Commercial
Code, see SMITH AND ROBERSON BusiNEss LAW 165 (Uniform Commercial Code ed. 1962).
30 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-106.
31 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-106. For an expansion of the definition of a "sale"
not to the contrary, see Arrowhead Sportswear Corp. v. School District, 22 Pa. D.&C. d
134, (1960); National Dairy Products Corp. v. Gleeson, 16 Pa. D.&C.2d 390, 72 Dauph.
112 (1958).
3 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1).
33 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-104.
34 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Art. 2.
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sold.35 Section 2-314(1) explicitly provides that the serving of food or
drink is a sale. This provision, viewed in the light of the Gottsdanker and
Merek expansion,3 6 would allow such a warranty to accompany the sale
of vaccine as well as blood plasma. The implied warranty of merchant-
ability imposed is limited in that it applies only to those goods which are
used for the ordinary purpose for which such goods were developed.3 7
This requirement seems to indicate that goods must be of ordinary quality
when sold. In the case of blood, since medical science cannot discover
whether blood is infected with serum hepatitis or not,38 this provision
might be satisfied by labeling the blood to the effect that the user might
contract serum hepatitis from a transfusion of such blood. Thus, in a
situation where a blood bank supplies blood directly to the patient for a
price, according to this interpretation of the Code, a sale has occurred.
Such a sale, furthermore, carries with it the implied warranty of merchant-
ability, which, if broken, gives a cause of action to the injured party.
To date, there has been only one reported Code case that has inter-
preted those Code sections analyzed in this note. In Epstein v. Giannat-
tasio3 9 plaintiff requested a beauty treatment and suffered acute dermatitis
and disfigurement because of a misuse of certain products by her beauty
salon. She sought recovery against the salon and the maker of the product
on an implied sales warranty theory. To arrive at a conclusion, the Ep-
stein court analyzed and discussed several of the pertinent Code pro-
visions.40 After such an analysis, the court held that where service is the
predominant feature of a transaction, even though goods are also trans-
ferred during that transaction, the transfer is incidental to the overall
service, and no sale has been accomplished under the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code.41
In arriving at its holding the court relied on "a ... dearth of case law
construing the statutes . ..-42 which were drawn from pre-Code food
35 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 (1): "Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316),
a warranty that goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if
the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind."
36 Merek & Co. v. Kidd, supra note 13; Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, supra
note 15.
37 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2C): "Goods to be merchantable must be at
least such as are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."
38 See supra note 25.
a3 25 Conn. Sup. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1963).
40 The Epstein court discussed the following provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code as adopted by the Connecticut statutes, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-1-101,
42a-2-102, 42a-2-105, 42a-2-106, 42a-2-401 (1963).
41 Epstein v. Giannattasio, supra note 39 at -, 197 A.2d at 344.
42 Ibid.
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cases which had construed the prior sales act. The court cited and relied
on cases which held that the service of food in a restaurant for immediate
consumption on the premises did not constitute a sale.43 By basing its
holding on prior food cases which had been used to construe the Uniform
Sales Act, its holding in this case is inaccurate. According to the official
comments regarding Section 2-314(1) of the Code, "subsection (1) covers
the warranty with respect to food and drink. Serving food or drink for
value is a sale, whether to be consumed on the premises or elsewhere.
Cases to the contrary are rejected.' 44 The Epstein court ignored Section
2-314 in arriving at its conclusion, and to the extent that it did so, its logic
and reasoning is inaccurate. If the court's reasoning had been accurate, its
decision would have foreshadowed a result under the Code that would
have been similar to the food and drug decisions in a case where a patient
purchased blood from a blood bank. However, to the extent that in-
accuracies exist in the court's reasoning, the Epstein conclusion should be
disregarded and an analysis of the Code sections, as set out in this note,
could be used to construe a situation similar to that in the Balkowitscb
case if it should arise in a Code jurisdiction.
If a situation similar to that in the Balkowitsch case should arise again
wherein defendant is a blood bank, under existing case law, plaintiff will
have little chance to recover under any theory of law. Since most blood
banks are charitable, non-profit making organizations, courts have been
reluctant to grant recovery against them on any legal theory. 45 With this
premise in mind, courts have manipulated logic and precedent to disregard
theory after theory underlying grounds for recovery, which injured plain-
tiffs have presented in these cases.
Since blood banks cannot scientifically be held negligent in not discov-
ering the existence of serum hepatitis in either the donor or donated
blood, the injured party is left with a strict liability theory in seeking
recovery. It can be argued in both Code and non-Code jurisdictions that
legal recovery is feasible under the sales strict liability theory of implied
warranty. The trend today is for courts to grant recovery on both tort and
contract strict liability theories in many areas where products and sub-
43Albrecht v. Rubenstein, 135 Conn. 243, 63 A.2d 158 (1948); See also Lynch v.
Hotel Bond Co., 117 Conn. 128, 167 At. 99 (1933); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H.
427, 128 Ad. 343 (1925); Sofman v. Denham Food Service, Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d
168 (1962).
All cases cited were decided before Uniform Commercial Code provisions went into
effect in their respective jurisdictions. For pertinent dates see Freedman, Products
Liability under the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 PRAC. LAW. 49 (1964).
44 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, comment 5 to § 2-314 (emphasis added).
45 Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, supra note 1 at 810.
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stances are dangerous to life and limb.46 In the long line of serum hepatitis
cases, courts have excepted their holdings to this trend by making legis-
lative policy decisions to protect blood distributors from liability. It
appears, in this area, that courts have usurped legislative prerogative by
concluding that blood distributors should not be protected against liability
by insurance as other manufacturers and distributors are. These policy
considerations seem to have influenced courts' decisions in this area. If
courts continue to abide by policy-steeped serum hepatitis precedents, it
is doubtful whether the arguments advanced in this note, though plausible,
will find acceptance. For plaintiff-patient virtually all roads of recovery
have been closed by prior decisions. However, as herein demonstrated, the
sales warranty of recovery cannot be ignored as a recovery theory in a
factual situation such as appears in the Balkowitsch case.
Irwin Rosen
46Products to which strict liability has been applied have been soap (Kruper v. Proc-
tor & Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605, Ohio App., 1953); detergent (Worley v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532, 1952); grinding wheels; (Jakubowski
v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 1963); airplane parts
(Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 1963).
SALES-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-LABEL
WARNING REQUIREMENTS
The Hubbard-Hall Chemical Company manufactured and sold an in-
secticide to a small farmer. The decedents who worked for the farmer
had used the product on several occasions, but for some unforeseen reason
had died from the insecticide after spending an entire day spraying. When
the product was originally developed, registration was approved by the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. A label on the container of the product
warned the user that the insecticide contained a poisonous dust which
might be fatal if smelled, inhaled or absorbed through the skin, and gave
directions in regard to using the product, to wearing the proper clothing,
and to treating anyone who might come in contact with the dust.' Even
1 Hubbard-Hall Chemical Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 403 (1965): "Warning:
May Be Fatal If Swallowed, Inhaled or Absorbed Through Skin. Do not get in eyes
or on skin. Wear natural rubber gloves, protective clothing and goggles. In case of
contact wash immediately with soap and water. Wear a mask or respirator of a type
passed by the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture for parathion protection. Keep all unpro-
tected persons out of operating areas or vicinity where there may be danger of drift.
Vacated areas should not be re-entered until drifting insecticide and volatile residues
have dissipated. Do not contaminate feed and foodstuffs. Wash hands, arms and face
thoroughly with soap and water before eating or smoking. Wash all contaminated
clothing with soap and hot water before re-use."
